Confidence judgments are self-assessments of the quality of one's own performance, 39 and are a crucial aspect of metacognitive abilities. The underlying neurobiological mechanisms 40 are poorly understood. One approach to understanding these mechanisms would be to take 41 advantage of putative metacognitive abilities in non-human models. However, many 42 discrepancies exist between human and non-human studies on metacognition due to the mode 43 of reporting judgements. We here present an attempt to directly compare human and non-44 human primates' metacognitive abilities using a protocol assessing confidence judgments. After 45 performing a categorization test, subjects could either validate their choice or review the test. 46 We could assess whether subjects detected their errors and how they corrected them according 47 to their confidence, and importantly did so in both human and non-human primates. 14 humans 48 and 2 macaque monkeys were tested. Humans showed a well-adapted use of the review option 49 by reviewing more after incorrect choices or difficult stimuli. Non-human primates did not 50 demonstrate a convincing use of the review or validate opportunity. In both species, reviewing 51 did not improve performance. This study shows that decisions to review under uncertainty are 52 not naturally beneficial to performance and is rather perturbed by biases and alternative low-53 cognitive cost strategies. 54 55 65 overconfident that their choice was/will be correct. Many theories have been proposed to 66 explain how confidence judgments predict accuracy, but they do not account for the wide range 67 of behavioural observations 5 . Nevertheless, an influential proposition is that people rely on 68 inference to judge their performance, by accessing important features such as familiarity or 69 difficulty with the test 6,7 . 70 157 than when they subsequently validated (Figure 2D , mixed-effect glm, factor decision, F=684.9, 158 p=7.4e-143). Subjects were slower when making an incorrect choice compared to a correct one, 159 independently of the subsequent decision (validate or review) and more strongly for difficult 160 
Introduction
After a decision, and before receiving any feedback, we may feel more or less confident 57 that it was the correct one. For example, being confident you locked your car you will continue 58 shopping, but if you are unsure, you will probably go back and check. Subjective confidence is 59 one core aspect of metacognitive abilities, which represent higher order mental processes by 60 which we monitor and control our own cognition 1 . In Humans, subjective confidence has 61 generally been studied using prospective or retrospective questionnaires, requiring explicit 62 verbal reports (e.g. confidence ratings 2,3 ). Subjects are fairly good at judging their accuracy in 63 both perceptual or mnemonic tasks 4 . Both prospective and retrospective confidence ratings 64 appear to be highly correlated with one's own performance, even if humans appear generally 3 To study confidence in non-human animals, researchers have adopted a broader view 71 than for human studies, and explored a wider range of behaviour that might elicit metacognitive 72 processes. Initial demonstration of animal metacognitive abilities involved "uncertain response" 73 protocols, in which difficult tests could be avoided by the use of an alternative non-directed 74 option. This option can be seen as a "choice to not choose", and in theory it should be elicited 75 by higher uncertainty about the outcome of the main choice 8, 9 . Species including monkeys or 76 dolphins efficiently used this option, although doubts have been raised concerning the 77 involvement of metacognition in making such decisions 10 . Other studies attempted to 78 approximate human protocols by assessing confidence judgment using a betting procedure 11 . In 79 these tasks, monkeys were primarily asked to perform a perceptual test. After each trial they 80 were then required to rate their confidence by 'betting on their success' (validating their choice) 81 or alternatively by using a safe option. Monkeys correctly took the opportunity to bet, by betting 82 more when correct 11, 12 . Finally, a large body of work has focused on information-seeking 83 behaviour as a mean of understanding metacognitive abilities in non-human animals 13, 14 . This 84 approach appeared more justified from an ecological point of view, as metacognition might 85 enable animals to search for or verify information to improve their decisions. Such behaviour is 86 thought to reflect higher cognitive processing. This is supported by studies highlighting that an 87 animal will search for information when ignorant or uncertain about what to do [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . Taken 88 together, these studies show that information-seeking is targeted, ordered and optional, 89 suggesting that such a search derives from metacognitive processes. 90 However, although information-seeking protocols have provided meaningful behavioural 91 insight concerning putative non-human metacognitive abilities, they often appear inappropriate 92 from a psychophysical or neurophysiological perspective, and are frequently criticised for poor 93 control over experimental conditions. Notably, it has been suggested that simpler heuristics 94 could be used to solve these tasks, questioning the need to rely on metacognition in such 95 information-seeking paradigms 17 . Also, available paradigms did not assess an important feature 96 of metacognition, which goes beyond simply validating or not a response based on uncertainty, 97 to explicitly test the use of this decision to further seek information for improving performance. 98 The objective of our current study was to test a new protocol adapted to human and non-human 99 primates and devoted to study information-seeking and metacognition, possibly in the context of 100 neurophysiological studies. Results 106 We designed a new behavioural task that allowed subjects to freely choose whether or 107 not to review a test before validating their decisions (Figure 1A) . In each trial, subjects were first 108 (1) asked to report the angle (right or left) of an oriented grating and then (2) proposed to review 109 or validate their choice. If subjects decided to review, they were able to go through the 110 categorization and decision stages again. The aim of this task was to promote review depending 111 on one's own perceived uncertainty, as well as allowing subjects to use their uncertainty to 112 guide further decisions. We first tested 14 human subjects in this new task. Subjects' 113 performances in the categorization were standardized using a staircase procedure prior to the 114 experiment, defining the 3 levels of difficulty used thereafter (see Methods and Figure 1B ). was oriented to the right or to the left. After the right/left choice (Choice Stage), subjects could 120 decide whether to validate or review the stimulus to retry the test (Decision Stage). Visual 121 feedback was given only after subjects' decision to validate. In the monkey version of the task 122 (bottom panel), they were required to hold a lever to initiate a trial and stimuli were oriented (Figure 2A) . They reviewed significantly more often for harder stimuli than easier ones 136 (mixed-effect glm, factor difficulty, F=33.6, p=3.3e-9). Contrary to our predictions, however, we 137 observed no gain in performance after reviews ( Figure 2B) . In fact, the number of successive 138 reviews a subject performed had a significantly detrimental effect on performance, notably after 139 2 successive reviews (mixed-effect glm; factor difficulty, F=61.7, p=4.0e-19; factor nbReview, 140 F=4.24, p=0.016; the interaction did not survive model selection) (post hoc comparison of 141 performance after 0 vs. 2 reviews, Wald test p=0.013; other conditions, p>0.12). Thus subjects 142 took the opportunity to review when it made sense to do so, but gained no benefits on 143 performance. This suggests that the probability to review depended on confidence level but that 144 reviewing could not be leveraged to increase performance. 145 A more detailed analysis revealed that subjects not only reviewed more often for difficult 146 trials than for easy ones, but also that decisions were related to categorization accuracy ( Figure   147 2C). Reviews were significantly more frequent after an incorrect response on the first choice 148 than after a correct one (mixed-effect glm, interaction feedback x difficulty, F=13.3, p=1.04e-5). 149 The percent of reviews after a correct choice decreased with easier conditions, but 150 concomitantly increased after incorrect choices. The difference incorrect versus correct 151 decreased with increased difficulty. Thus, subjects were able to detect their own errors and 152 reviewed appropriately, and this ability was greater when confronted with simple 153 categorizations. This indicates that uncertainty about one's own performance was higher in the 154 most difficult condition, inducing more decisions to review. 155 Response times can reflect the process by which confidence contribute to the decision to 156 review. Indeed, subjects were significantly slower to choose when they subsequently reviewed 6 trials (interaction feedback x difficulty, F=9.37, p=8.6e-5; Wald test, p<0.03 for all 161 incorrect/correct comparisons. No other interactions survived model selection). At decision time 162 (review or confirm), subjects were also slower following incorrect choices compared to correct 163 ones, and slower when reviewing compared to confirming their choice (Figure 2E , mixed-effect 164 glm, factor decision, F=63.4, p=2e-15; factor feedback, F=8.51, p=3.5e-3). Difficulty as well as 165 interactions did not survive in that case. Even though similar effects were observed for both 166 response times, differences appeared substantially greater at the choice stage (right/left target 167 selection) than the decision stage. Such observations revealed that subjects' confidence 168 continuously impacted behaviour at all stages and even before the appearance of decision (Wald test with FDR correction) are reported as follow: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. In D, 180 stars and sharp symbols stand respectively for a significant difference between incorrect/correct 181 or validate/review. In E, no symbols were reported given that the best final model did not include 182 the factor condition. Instead, FDR-corrected p-values were provided. In A-E, dots represent 183 individual subjects' performance.
185
Lack of behavioural adaptation following a review in Humans 186 The above results mostly show that subjects use the review option in an adapted 187 manner. However, the main goal of metacognitive abilities is not only to estimate how uncertain 188 subjects are in a given situation, but also to promote information seeking to improve 189 performance. To investigate such process, we calculated the categorization sensitivity (type1) 190 and metacognitive sensitivity (type2) for each subject and for the three different conditions (see 191 Methods for details). As expected, type1 sensitivities decreased with difficulty (mixed-effect glm, 192 F=87.9, p=5.5e-15) ( Figure 3A) . However, type2 sensitivities revealed an unexpected result. 193 Even though type2 sensitivities varied significantly with difficulty (mixed-effect glm, F=3.96, 194 p=0.028), subjects showed relatively low metacognitive abilities, with type2 sensitivities close to 195 0 in the most difficult conditions. Also, type1 and type2 sensitivities were significantly correlated 196 (Spearman linear correlation, R=0.401, p=0.011, Figure 3B ). This suggests that subjects' Even if subjects showed markers of their ability to detect errors, they were relatively 210 unable to correct them (as suggested in Figure 2B ). Consistent with the overall low level of 211 metacognitive sensitivity, further analysis revealed unexpected consequences of the review 212 process. First, subjects showed on average a significant bias toward repeating the same 213 right/left choice after a review (i.e. percent of shift across difficulties was below 50%, Wilcoxon 214 sign rank test, z=-2.54, p=0.011) ( Figure 4A) , and this bias toward confirmation was not 215 modulated between conditions (mixed-effect glm, factor difficulty: F=1.97, p=0.152). Figure 4B 216 presents performance of subjects at different levels of review and depending on performance: in 217 grey the performance for first validated choices (D1, no review); in red, final performance 218 following an incorrect first choice (whatever the number of reviews, one or more), and in blue, 219 the final performance following a correct first choice. Note that in the HARD condition, the final 220 performance was particularly low when subjects initially made a mistake (i.e. red bar for HARD, 221 Wald test p<0.001) (mixed-effect glm, interaction difficulty x Trial type, F=2.74, p=0.03). Similar 222 decreases in performance following incorrect trials compared to correct ones was also observed 223 for MED and EASY conditions, albeit to a lesser extent (post-hoc comparison, p<0.018). 224 Alternatively, no differences were observed between the immediately validated performance 225 (D1) compared to the final performance following a correct choice in the first selection (COR) 226 (Wald test, all conditions at p>0.39). Thus, the review process worsened performance only 227 when the trial started with a mistake. In other word, confusion and/or confirmation biases arose 228 after errors during the successive reviews. Categorization performance in monkeys 239 Two male rhesus monkeys were tested in a task similar to the one used for human 240 subjects (Figure 1A, bottom panel) . Monkeys behaved correctly in the categorization test, by 241 showing appropriate psychometric performance. The discrimination thresholds differed between 242 monkeys, with monkey H being more accurate with lower angles than monkey D (Figure 1C) . 243 To elicit 60, 70 and 85% of correct responses, monkey H was tested with bar orientations of 1°, 244 2° and 5° relative to the vertical (5°, 10° and 20° for monkey D). Both monkeys had slightly 245 better performance for rightward stimuli compared to leftward (0.15° and 3.8° of performance 246 difference between right and left orientations for monkey H and D respectively). 247 To assess whether reaction and movement times varied between conditions, we used a A sub-optimal use of the review option in monkeys 267 After an initial use of the review option during the first sessions, both monkeys stopped 268 doing so for a long period of time ( Figure 5A) . Such behaviour forced us to slightly change the 269 task to familiarize them with the review option. Two main changes were tested: forced review 270 trials were included (i.e. in which the validate option was not available) and correct/incorrect 271 feedback was also adjusted to increase review benefits (i.e. more juice reward when correct and 272 less time penalty when incorrect after a review, these parameters also changed over time) (see 273 10 also "Notes on training procedure with monkeys" in Methods). Contrary to our predictions, these 274 changes did not elicit voluntary reviews (Figure 5A Figure 5D ). Such observation suggests a potential 293 benefit of the review process. 294 As described in the previous section, we did not observe clear modulations in RT and 295 MT depending on the subsequent decision to review or validate. Only decision MT in monkey D 296 were slower for confirmed choice compared to reviewed ones (mixed-effect glm, factor decision, 297 F=19.8, p=8.7e-6). In all other cases, the factor 'decision' did not survive model selections. The The behavioural benefits of the review process in terms of performance were different in 318 the two monkeys ( Figure 5E) . Specifically, for monkey D reviewing was neither advantageous 319 nor deleterious, the performance being modulated only by the difficulty (mixed-effect glm, 320 monkey D, factor difficulty: F=12.3, p=1.3e-5; no other factor or interaction survived model 321 selection). However, monkey H showed a significant increase in performance on reviewed trials, 322 modulated by the difficulty (mixed-effect glm, monkey H, interaction difficulty x nbReview, 323 F=4.77, p=9.3e-3; post-hoc comparison for each difficulty, Wald test p<4.5e-17). The 324 discrepancy between monkeys might be explained by differences in experimental conditions. 325 Monkey D was allowed to see the stimulus longer during the review (+400ms, representing a 326 duration gain of 80% on average), whereas monkey H was proposed a slightly simpler stimulus 327 after session number 94 (+3°, representing an ideal performance gain of 16.25% on average). 328 Such differences tends to suggest that reviewing the same stimulus (as in monkey D) did not 329 increase performance at all, even when displayed longer. In order to avoid spatial biases, but also to limit preparatory responses, we randomized 340 both Right/Left targets and Review/Validate levers locations between trials (on the right or left of 341 the screen). Yet we observed that both monkeys developed a strong spatial bias toward one 342 side, especially at the decision stage ( Figure 5G) In this study, we designed a protocol to assess confidence judgments under uncertainty, 355 but also the resulting behavioural adaptations. Inspired by information-seeking tasks, this novel 356 metacognitive task used reviews as a means to reveal confidence and was intended to test both 357 human and non-human primates. Observations in human subjects performing this task was in 358 accordance with previously reported results, showing that subject might be able to report 359 confidence with the opportunity to review or validate. However, in monkeys, the behavioural 360 study did not reveal expected review vs. validate behaviour. The main issue might be that, in 361 both species, reviewing did not improve performance and rather competed with, or was 362 perturbed, by alternative low-cognitive cost strategies. In this context, the design might have 363 hinder monkeys to use the review option appropriately. 364 
365
The behavioural task induced a review process triggered by difficulty and estimated 366 performance. Subjects' uncertainty on choice was reflected in the use of this option. They 367 showed behavioural markers of error detection, even before any feedback was delivered. This 368 confirmed previous observations that human subjects can adequately report retrospectively their 369 confidence in a perceptual choice 3 , although our protocol reveals subjects' confidence through 370 the measure of review behaviour and does not require explicit report. In this sense, this protocol 371 might be useful from a clinical perspective, especially when trying to understand why obsessive 372 compulsive disorder (OCD) patients showed excessive checking behaviour and impairments in 373 self-performance monitoring 18, 19 . Moreover, from a neurophysiological perspective, studies of 374 performance monitoring generally investigate adaptive processes after subjects receive 375 feedback on performance 20-22 (but see 23 ). Our protocol allows us to study markers of 376 performance monitoring in the absence of external feedback. 377 Metacognitive processes might also serve to promote correction of putative mistakes, in 378 order to improve decisions 1, 17 . Apparently, the current task design did not allow subjects to 379 improve their performance after the review process. Rather, subjects developed a bias toward 380 repeating the same choice even if they mostly reviewed after incorrect choices. Such 381 confirmation bias, often reported in the literature 24 , might contribute to the absence of 382 improvement. But it might also reveal that subjects used reviews as a form of verification, with 383 the objective of reducing their uncertainty about their first decision. This is in contrast to the use 384 14 of review to simply revise their first choice (as it would be the case for changes of mind). In that 385 sense, our task design might well capture the use of metacognitive evaluation for adaptive 386 change in control in order to acquire more information. Nevertheless, given that both underlying 387 reasons might contribute to subjects' use of reviews, further experiments are needed to reveal 388 subject's actual strategies at the trial level, for example by varying and controlling the quantity of 389 information given at any moment. Using appropriate modelling tools and experimental changes, 390 it might be possible to dissociate between subjects' overall bias (i.e. reviewing only for 391 confirmation about an uncertain first choice) and decisions that depend on recently collected 392 information. 393 The absence of improvement following a review might also explain why the signal 394 detection approach indicated poor metacognitive abilities. In the procedure, type2 measures 395 reflect the ability to detect and correct wrong decisions 25 , and scores of this measure were very 396 low. This should not be taken as the sole measure of metacognition. Subjects could not 397 adequately adapt their behaviour under high uncertainty (i.e. following a review), but had 398 chosen to review in a way that indicates some metacognitive process. This dissociation 399 therefore underlines the difficulty of finding a single measure of metacognition, and the fact that 400 several factors impinge on this ability. One interpretation is that, in the present context, the 401 review process counterintuitively generates interference or doubts that prevent the addition of 402 information across the successive reviews and hence the increase in performance. After the first 403 choice, during review, the perceptive information that is offered again to the subjects appeared 404 not to be integrated and cumulated. Rather, subjects might have based their decisions on purely 405 internal information related to performance (the perception of an initial error) or memory of the 406 first perceived stimulus. In this context reviews are detrimental. A study with OCD patients 407 similarly observed that patients seemed to use mnemonic cues to respond to a discrimination 408 test after numerous reviews and did not use the available perceptual information anymore 26 . 409 More recently, other experiments report similar detrimental effect of reviews in healthy 410 subjects 27-29 . We argue here that subjects did so especially when uncertainty was maximal (in 411 the more difficult condition), by making a choice depending only on a poor memory of the 412 stimulus and a pure guess on the current correct response. If this appears to be true, we might 413 expect changes in neurophysiological markers that are incongruent with the information 414 provided by the stimulus. 415 Finally, the existence of a correlation between perceptual and metacognitive abilities 416 suggests that both rely on the same underlying estimation (i.e. perceptual in this case). The Taken together, our observations highlight that the task might be appropriate to study 430 metacognition from an information-seeking point of view. Review behaviour allowed us to 431 address two metacognitive mechanisms: the monitoring of decisions and the related adaptation 432 that might occur. However, subjects' behaviour suggests that the review option was mostly for 433 self-confirmation rather than a way to modify a choice. Post-decision adaptation was sub-434 optimal in our subjects, possibly due to task design issues as discussed next. 435 436 Recent studies have shown the possibility to test some forms of checking behaviours in 437 monkeys 33,34 . In the present study, we were not able to elicit reviews in monkeys that would be 438 based on their perceived uncertainty. Despite weak evidence of their ability to adequately use 439 the review option, monkeys quickly fell into a non-optimal and cognitively less-demanding 440 strategy to perform the task. Such failure might be explained by different factors as discussed 441 below. 442 First, the difficulty to elicit reviews in monkeys might depend on the learning procedure 443 we adopted, or a related issue concerning the task design itself. Assessing metacognitive 444 abilities in monkeys requires avoidance of the development of alternative strategies 35 . In 445 particular, reward-induced biases or external cue associations need to be tightly controlled so 446 as to avoid confounds with the intended effect of metacognitive process. In the literature, many 447 studies were debated due to the possible use of alternative non-metacognitive processes 8, 9, 13, 35 . 448 We tested whether a protocol with an adaptive review process would be efficient. However, as 449 observed by Son & Kornell 11 , even simpler protocols by comparison to the one we developed, 450 using high and low-bets following a perceptual response, are tricky to use in monkeys. In their 451 study, authors reported their failure to elicit an efficient use of the decision stage, due to the 452 expression of a bias toward a specific option (selecting only the high-bet option). However, after 453 16 a long training and many modifications in the task design, they were able to elicit what they 454 consider to be an optimal use of bet options 11,12 . 455 In our task, the credit assignment problem, i.e. figuring out the link between a specific 456 choice (right or left) and a delayed reward (after the decision stage), was arguably the most 457 challenging element. Credit assignment is a complex issue especially in sequentially structured 458 tasks or in multiple choice situations 36 . For monkeys, one way to bypass such an issue might be 459 to always validate a choice and not take into account the decision stage. This was our monkeys' 460 first strategy. Importantly, when we introduced the single review option, monkeys soon used the 461 opportunity to review. In this case, the association between choice and feedback was 462 sometimes present (after a review, the feedback was given immediately after the second 463 right/left choice), and monkeys changed their strategies accordingly. However, both monkeys 464 also adopted a simpler spatial strategy. Reviewing might have been perceived as effortful, and 465 as similar as cancelling a previous choice. Even if a visual cue indicated trial transitions, adding 466 contextual information to clarify the structure of a trial might have helped (e.g. changing the 467 background colour from one trial to another). 468 Another possible explanation was that monkeys never perceived the benefits associated 469 with the review option, even if analyses revealed an advantage for one individual. Reviewing a 470 choice underlies a greater cost than validating, in terms of physical and cognitive effort at least. 471 Delay and effort are two separate features that both depreciate human and non-human 472 decisions when experienced 37, 38 . Even if the review vs. validate options were equalized in 473 duration, our results might suggest that our monkeys were more sensitive to effort than delay, 474 and so were less willing to review a choice than to wait during the time penalty after an error. 475 Finally, one might question the ability of monkeys to use their own confidence. The 476 failure to induce reviews in our experiment is certainly not only explained by a natural inability to 477 express metacognition. Nevertheless, this question is hotly debated in the literature 32,39,40 . 478 Information-seeking protocols appear to be highly relevant to study metacognitive processes in 479 animals as one-trial tests have revealed abilities of self-knowledge based adaptive behaviour in 480 macaques 16 . Importantly, macaques showed appropriate patterns of responses in uncertainty 481 test whereas new world monkeys (capuchin) did not 41 . Yet, few studies reported the relative 482 volatility of metacognitive responses or even the absence of such response in many individuals 483 and different species tested with or without extensive training 11, 14, 42 . Concomitantly, two main 484 criticisms have been proposed against the existence of metacognition in non-human animals. 485 The first is that simple heuristics like reward associations, and not metacognition, guide visual feedback was displayed centrally for 800ms, consisting of the word "correct" (shown in 539 green) or "incorrect" (in red), and a new stimulus was presented on the subsequent trial. A 540 review was potentially triggered by a subjective lack of confidence. If subjects decided to review, 541 the same stimulus was presented again and a new choice could be made. Note that following 542 half of the reviews, subjects were presented with a longer stimulus than on its first presentation, 543 for a duration of 250ms instead of 200ms. The trial ended only after the subject validated their 544 choice. Correct trials were not rewarded per se, but incorrect trials were penalized by a time 545 penalty of 15 seconds. A 1000ms delay was introduced between trials. 546 Subjects were required to perform 420 trials, divided into 6 blocks of 70 trials (note that 1 547 subject performed blocks of 65 trials instead). Between blocks, subjects were able to take rest. 548 At the start of the experiment, instructions were given to explain the nature of the task as 549 described above. Emphasis was placed on the general idea that the review option could help 550 the subject complete the experiment more quickly, i.e. that reviews and consequent 551 improvement of performance would compensate for the time-out after errors.
553
Monkeys. Monkeys were trained to perform a task similar to the one use with humans, 554 where they were required to perform a categorization test based on the orientation of a bar, and 555 then to either validate or review their choice (Figure 1A, bottom panel) . 556 
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To initiate a trial, monkeys had to touch and hold a lever item, represented by a grey 557 triangle on the bottom of the screen. Once touched, a central dot appeared on the screen for 558 800ms. Then, the central dot turned off and the stimulus appeared on the screen (a grey 559 rightward or leftward oriented bar) for a duration between 400 and 900ms (this duration was 560 fixed during a session but changed across training). After a delay of 200ms, two oriented bars 561 (one oriented 45° to the left, the other 45° to the right relative to the vertical) were used as 562 targets. The relative position of targets was randomized from one trial to another (e.g. the 563 leftward bar might be either positioned on the right part or the left part of the screen, randomly). 564 Monkeys reported their choice by touching one of the targets. This was followed by an 565 additional delay of 200ms. The two decision levers were then displayed, allowing monkeys to 566 review or validate their previous choice. The review option was represented by a grey inverted 567 triangle lever, and the validate option by a grey disk. The position of each lever on the screen 568 (bottom right or left) was randomly assigned from one trial to the next. 569 If monkeys touched the validate option they received a feedback corresponding to their 570 performance: correct choices were rewarded by a squirt of apple juice lasting between 300 and 571 1000ms, incorrect choices were penalized by a grey screen lasting between 10000 and 572 15000ms (note that rewards and penalties changed over the course of training, hence the range 573 of values). To equalize review/validate options duration, the duration of a penalty for incorrect 574 validation was set to be equal to two review trials. However, it is important to keep in mind that, 575 by design, review trials are more effortful than validated ones, given the number of touches 576 required. After the feedback delivery, a visual signal was displayed on the screen, consisting of 577 a red circle lasting 800ms, and indicating the change of condition. 578 If monkeys touched the review option, the central dot appeared again on the screen for 579 800ms and the stimulus was displayed. Two particular modifications of the task were used to 580 stimulate the review process. First, the duration of the stimulus was increased by 400ms after 581 each review. In some of monkey H's sessions, the duration of the stimulus was not increased, 582 but instead the stimulus became easier (larger angle) after reviews (this was the case for all the 583 sessions analysed thereafter, see Results for details). The following events were the same as 584 described above. Second, feedback duration was modified if monkeys reviewed at least once. 585 Correct choices were more rewarded after a review than after no review, with duration of reward 586 between 500 and 1400ms (+91.6% and +77.7% of reward for monkey D and H respectively). 587 Also, incorrect choices were less penalized after reviews, with a time penalty between 1000 and 588 3000ms (-82.6% and -79.4% for monkey D and H respectively). These explicit benefits of the 589 review were introduced to help monkeys during the training procedure (by increasing the review 590 20 utility), but were not intended to be used after the completion of the training (see below for 591 details on training).
593
Staircase & Psychometric analysis 594 To maintain different levels of uncertainty during the categorization, three different 595 stimulus orientations were used randomly across trials (i.e. HARD, MED and EASY). 596 For human subjects, orientations were determined depending on subject's own 597 performance using a classical staircase procedure prior to the experiment. In this procedure 598 (which lasted 240 trials), subjects had to choose whether the stimulus was leftward or rightward 599 oriented, without the possibility to review or validate their choice. Stimulus orientations were 600 defined depending on subjects' performance, with 3 randomly mixed staircase rules 46 (one-up 601 one-down, one-up two-down and one-up three-down). The use of the 3 parallel staircases 602 procedure (80 trials each) allowed us to assess subjects' performance more accurately. Based 603 on performance during the staircase procedure, we calculated a psychometric curve for each 604 subject, using a binomial generalized linear model (logistic regression). Three absolute stimuli 21 as monkeys' metacognitive ability 16 . However, during the learning phase with the decision 626 stage, we faced a few issues that led us to modify the task design in several steps. Specifically, 627 after experiencing the review option both monkeys stopped using it within a few sessions (see 628 Figure 5A ). We thus implemented three main changes: 1) a small proportion of forced review 629 trials (10-25%) were introduced (on these trials, only the review target is presented at the first 630 decision stage), 2) penalties and rewards were adjusted throughout the training to increase the 631 utility of the review and 3) monkeys could not review more than one time in a row, without the 632 need to validate after the review (i.e. no second decision stage were proposed, and importantly, 633 feedback was delivered immediately after the second choice). 634 Here, we report behavioural data for 22 and 38 sessions (for monkey D and H 635 respectively). Sessions were selected based on the frequency in choosing the review option. To 636 accurately assess putative metacognitive performances, we excluded sessions before the 637 monkeys selected the review option in a stable manner (see Results for details).
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Behavioural Analysis
